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THINKING DESCARTES IN CONJUNCTION, WITH  
MERLEAU-PONTY: THE HUMAN BODY, THE FUTURE, 
AND HISTORICITY 
JAMES GRIFFITH, Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts, Bratislava, SR  
This article addresses a debate in Descartes scholarship over the mind-depen-
dence or -independence of time by turning to Merleau-Ponty’s Nature and The 
Visible and the Invisible. In doing so, it shows that both sides of the debate 
ignore that time for Descartes is a measure of duration in general. The conse-
quences to remembering what time is are that the future is shown to be the in-
visible of an intertwining of past and future, and that historicity is the invisible 
of God. 
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There is a debate whether time in Descartes is dependent on or independent of 
the mind. By turning to Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the intertwining of mind and 
human body, it becomes clear this debate is founded on a misunderstanding. The 
consequences of resolving this issue have much to say about history and historicity 
in Descartes. 
Now, Merleau-Ponty points out that there is a “change of perspective” within 
the Meditations between the Second Meditation’s thought of the body as one part of 
extension among others and the Sixth Meditation’s thought of it as in union with the 
mind or soul, both of which are necessary for Descartes and neither of which can
be thought simultaneously (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 16; 1995, 34 – 36). While Descar-
tes leaves this situation as a “juxtaposition,” the contradiction of the body as part of 
extension and as unified with mind is for Merleau-Ponty “constitutive of the hu-
man” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 20 and 129; 1995, 39 and 174). However, when the 
Sixth Meditation discusses the union of mind and body, it is as a conjunction (see 
Descartes 1904, 81), which is also the word used in the Principles (see Descartes 
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1905, 41). Rather than unity as oneness and rather than one substance placed aga-
inst the other, it would seem that the mind and the human body are joined in their 
differentiation as distinct substances. The human body as a part of extension rema-
ins distinct from the mind even while the mind is conjoined to it. The human is 
contradictory insofar as it is a conjunction of material and immaterial substance. 
Understanding Descartes on the human body as a conjunction brings his philosophy 
closer to Merleau-Ponty’s thought of the intertwining of visible and invisible. 
To be sure, the centuries between these two make for significant differences. 
Twentieth-century physics does not think particles, for instance, as Descartes thinks 
them (see Merleau-Ponty 2003, 90; 1995, 126). This progress believed itself to be 
founded on “Cartesianism,” but the progress itself undermined those foundations 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968, 26). In addition, the emergence of modern physics occurs 
through, among other things, Einstein’s proposal “to come back to” particle theories 
of light, rather than wave theories (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 90; 1995, 126). The mo-
vement of what is to come moves through what preceded, both in their successes 
and failures. To think Descartes as a philosopher of conjunction is made possible 
by, among others, Merleau-Ponty, but to think him in this way is not to transform 
the former into the latter. Rather, it is to think them in their conjunction, to hold 
them as joined in their separation such that a thought of Descartes that can better 
account for Descartes, perhaps invisible to his thought of himself or to what Carte-
sians made of him, may emerge.1
Cartesian Space and Descartes’ Space 
To begin to understand Descartes as a philosopher of conjunction, it is helpful 
to look at Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Sartre, “the last of the Cartesians” (Grene, 
72). In Being and Nothingness, being-in-itself is non-conscious being, the thingness 
of a thing in its identity with itself and without differentiation of inside and outside 
(see Sartre, 28). Being-in-itself simply is what it is. Opposed to this is being-for-
itself, or consciousness, which apprehends the world as “a nihilation,” the negation 
of the self-identity of the in-itself of non-conscious things such that they become 
objects of and for consciousness (Sartre, 52). However, there is no in-itself to the 
                                                          
1.Thanks to Richard A. Lee, Jr., Yves Charles Zarka, Petr Kouba, and the anonymous reviewers 
for their helpful remarks on earlier drafts of this essay. 
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for-itself because to be aware of one’s consciousness in this way entails being con-
scious, i.e., being-for-itself (see Sartre, 121). The gap between consciousness and 
the consciousness of consciousness means “it is necessary that the unity of this 
being include its own nothingness as the nihilation of identity” even while “the for-
itself is” (Sartre, 125). Among the in-itselfs that the for-itself nihilates is the past, 
which is “a For-Itself reapprehended and inundated by the In-itself” (Sartre, 175). 
My past is “My essence” insofar as those prior events become events to be appre-
hended, i.e., in-itselfs to be nihilated by a for-itself that is the present (Sartre, 175). 
The past is given meaning as or becomes my essential past by the for-itself’s nihila-
tion of the past as such. 
For Merleau-Ponty, Sarte’s nihilation of the in-itself would link him to Descar-
tes (see Merleau-Ponty 2003, 94; 1995, 131) and it misunderstands meaning (see 
Merleau-Ponty 1968, 216). That is, in nihilating the in-itself, Sartre’s for-itself does 
not give it meaning, but rather reinscribes the in-itself as merely other than the for-
itself. What is visible to myself becomes what is invisible to the other, what is visi-
ble of the other what is invisible of myself. The invisible for Merleau-Ponty is “the 
secret counterpart” of the visible, rather than its opposite or contradictory, because 
the invisible only appears “within” what is visible (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 215). 
When I sense the world, I sense what is invisible of it as the not-visible, and mea-
ning is the invisible of the world as it appears. That is, the world as meaningful is 
“not an informed mass” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 223; 1995, 285). Finally, being is an 
“encroachment” or “junction at a distance [jonction à distance]” of my visible upon 
the other and the world and the world’s encroachment upon myself whereby mea-
ning is given, or a world appears (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 216; 1964, 265). 
However, he also does not want to oppose to Sartre a sacrifice of the for-itself 
to the in-itself. In such a sacrifice, the in-itself, non-conscious things identical with 
themselves, would be the model of thought and the for-itself would make the in-
itself come to be as that to which the for-itself has no access. This is what he calls 
the anthropological meaning of humanism (see Merleau-Ponty 2003, 136; 1995, 
182). Consciousness would generate the non-conscious world as that of which it 
cannot be conscious. The in-itself would then be a nothingness surrounding and 
created by the for-itself. For him, this model “is still to think the Weltlichkeit of 
minds according to the model of Cartesian space” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 216). Car-
tesianism idealizes the world by defining it as objects placed before idealized thou-
ght, which, intentionally or not, places bodies in “a network of objective processes” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968, 26). Cartesian space, then, is an immanent container within 
           
which objects appear. Even if that container is itself nothingness, it surrounds and 
envelops the objects of the world and each for-itself. Even if that space or 
nothingness is immanent, it is “objective-immanent,” discernible as an object by the 
nothingness of in-itselfs (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 216). Behind that object of imma-
nent nothingness enveloping the world stands God (see Merleau-Ponty 2003, 127; 
1995, 171). Instead of Cartesian space, Merleau-Ponty proposes “a space of tran-
scendence, a space of incompossibilities,” an “aesthetic world” of things pushing 
such that being and nothingness are in “indivision” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 216). 
With such a space, being and nothingness intertwine as separated and nothingness 
is already present in being’s presence. 
One issue is that Descartes’ understanding of space seems similar to this 
aesthetic world of the push. In the Principles, the nature of a body for Descartes is 
only its extension (see Descartes 1985, 224). Thus, “There is no real distinction 
between space, or internal place [locus internus], and the corporeal substance conta-
ined in it” (Descartes 1985, 227; 1905, 45). A real distinction for Descartes is only 
between substances, substances being what exists without dependence on anything 
else (see Descartes 1905, 28 and 24). A conceptual distinction is “between a sub-
stance and some attribute of that substance without which the substance is unintelli-
gible; alternatively it is a distinction between two such attributes of a single sub-
stance” (Descartes 1985, 214). At most, then, the distinction between locus internus
and the corporeal substance it contains is conceptual. ‘Place’ and ‘space’ in fact 
mean the same thing, but ‘external place’ (locus externus, place) refers to an ob-
ject’s position, while ‘internal place’ refers to its size and shape (see Descartes 
1905, 47 – 48). This external place “may be taken as being the surface immediately 
surrounding what is in the place,” where ‘surface’ indicates “the boundary between 
the surrounding and surrounded bodies” (Descartes 1985, 229). The network of 
objective processes that envelop objects would then be locus externus rather than 
locus internus, but the possibility of the former emerges from the mutual surfaces of 
the objects of the latter. 
As a result of this mutual surface between spatial bodies in their places, there 
is no vacuum between them, no immanent nothingness (see Descartes 1905, 49). 
The space of all bodies, or the extension of the world as such (including the hea-
vens), “is indefinite” because it “has no limits to its extension” (Descartes 1985, 
232). While we may imagine boundaries to the world in its extension, some exten-
ded space is always beyond them. We imagine not just the world’s boundaries, but 
their beyond, and this beyond is “imaginable in a true fashion, that is, real [vere 
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imaginabilia, hoc est, realia]” (Descartes 1985, 232; 1905, 52). As indefinite, space 
is understood as truly imagined to have boundaries beyond its boundaries, to push 
beyond itself. Space is not infinite because ‘infinite’ refers not to a lack of limits but 
to the positive understanding “that there are none,” and is a term reserved for God 
alone (Descartes 1985, 202).2
Thinking in Conjunction 
                                                          
2 I therefore believe Puškari misses the nuance of a truly imagined beyond of space’s indefinite 
boundaries as being perceived. The indefinite is not potentially infinite in the sense of being 
“incomplete” (Puškari, 286). What is indefinite is complete in itself as a locus internus, even if it 
lacks perfections. What is lacking is the perception of its completeness, though we can perceive 
a truly imagined completeness. The imagining of space as indefinite can be perceived as true, and 
what is perceived as true of this imagining is the completeness of space as locus internus as such. 
If it lacks perfections, it is not infinite even potentially because space as such is necessarily limi-
ted, bounded. The imagination is closer to the potentially infinite in the sense she gives it since it 
allows us to perceive as true what is beyond the limits of our understanding or perception. 
However, though I cannot enter into it here, I would argue that even the imagination as po-
tentially infinite falls into the trap of sacrificing the for-itself to the in-itself insofar as what the 
imagination imagines is the world’s invisible to my visible. The imagination is probably better 
conceived here as in motion between the finite and infinite so as to imagine an indefinite to be 
perceived as true. See Griffith, chapter 4 for this argument, though not directly engaging the 
question of the potentially infinite. 
There is a distinction, then, between Descartes’ space and Cartesian, objective-
immanent space. Descartes’ space, as the extension of an object or as the extension 
of the world as such, cannot be imagined to be enclosed. Since there is no vacuum 
between the surface of different spatial objects in Descartes’ space, there is no 
nothing enclosing, between, or among them. Descartes’ spatial objects are objects 
of, not in space, and so are of space truly imagined as indefinitely pushing beyond 
its  boundaries.  In  this  way,  bodies  as  objects  of  locus  internus  are  the  push  of 
Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetic space of incompossible jointure without real distinction
 between them. 
If Descartes’ space as distinct from Cartesian bears similarity to Merleau
-Ponty’s aesthetic world of the push, then the latter may offer ways of thinking about
issues  in  Descartes  scholarship  concerning  motion  and  time.  First,  though,  we 
should look at Merleau-Ponty on Descartes’ understanding of the human body. 
           
In this way, the reality of the distinction between mind and human body can be 
thought in their conjunction. In the Principles, the mind is aware that sensations 
“cannot belong to it simply in virtue of its being a thinking thing,” which shows that 
the mind is “joined [adjuncta]” or “conjoined [conjunctum]” with the human body 
(Descartes 1985, 224; 1905, 41). If, on Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Descartes, the 
human body as human is unintelligible without being understood as a body conjoi-
ned with the mind, then to think the reality of the distinction of these substances is 
to think that reality as conceptual. This is not to say that the substances mind and 
body are not really independent of each other. Rather, it is to say that the distinction 
of human mind and human body as real can only be conceptual. Indeed, this con-
ceptuality to the real distinction between a human body and mind as conjoined is 
what Merleau-Ponty encounters when he calls the body an “Enigma...there are not 
two natures in it, but a double nature” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 211; 1995, 273). 
This body is not human without mind, this mind always of this body, the mutu-
al and non-vacuous surface between them not a surface between being and 
nothingness but between material and immaterial substance. Without the conjun-
ction of mind and body, the human body could not, as Descartes puts it in the Tre-
atise of Man, be imagined (supposer) as a machine to which a soul could be “joined 
and united [iointes & unies]” (Descartes 2003, 2 and 1; 1909, 120). As conjunction 
of mind and body, the non-closed human body is of the push of the aesthetic, inde-
finite space of transcendence and incompossibility as itself a transcending incom-
possibility. This conjunction lets the body as human be discovered through its other 
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For Merleau-Ponty, Descartes understands the human body as “non-closed” 
and so “governed by thought” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 234). On this understanding, 
the human body becomes a body that is human—distinct from other animals’ “clo-
sed” bodies—through thought (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 234). That is, “human being 
is not animality (in the sense of mechanism) + reason” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 208; 
1995, 269). Reason is not superimposed upon the human body, but rather this body 
is discovered as body through thought. While other animals are within their bodies 
as a mechanism, leaving them closed, the openness of the human involves its being 
of its body (see Merleau-Ponty 2003, 217; 1995, 279). Even if the seeming closed-
ness  of  non-human  bodies  “is  founded  on  a  Cartesian  idealization,  on  the 
appearance of perceived exteriority” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 276; 1995, 343), for 
Merleau-Ponty  Descartes’  idea  of  the  human  body  is  of  one  that  reaches 
“completion” in thought, in what is invisible of it as a body that is specifically 
human (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 234). 
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and the mind as transcending itself discover itself as conjoined, find its limits in its 
completion as a mind of the human body. 
Duration and the Mind-Dependence or -Independence of Time 
Thinking the human body as a non-closed site of conjunction of indefinite 
aesthetic space is helpful for thinking time in Descartes. In the Principles, time is 
just duration in general and is a “mode of thought” or “in thought” rather than in the 
thing itself (Descartes 1985, 212). Modes, attributes, and qualities are identical 
here, though he uses ‘mode’ specifically for “thinking of a substance as being af-
fected or modified [variari],” so the variation to duration given as time is of or in 
thought (Descartes 1985, 211; 1905, 26). As a mode of or in thought, time is the 
measure of objects’ duration measured against the motion of the heavens (see Des-
cartes 1905, 27). Objects as enduring depend on motion insofar as duration is a 
variation in or mode of matter (“materiae variationem”), even if that variation or 
mode is “simply in our thought” (Descartes 1985, 232; 1905, 55). Motion is “the 
action by which a body travels from one place to another” and involves the same 
amount of action as a body at rest, both being modes of or in the body since neither 
motion nor rest subsist without a body (Descartes 1985, 233). A temporal body, 
then, is a mode of thought and of body as the measure of its duration against celes-
tial motion, both being produced by motion and being of motion even at rest. Mo-
tion’s primary cause is God, who “always preserves [conservare] the same quantity 
of motion in the universe” (Descartes 1985, 240; 1905, 61). 
Time, as a measure of the duration in general of terrestrial bodies against celes-
tial motion, is a mode of a non-closed body’s thought. There is no time without 
durational bodies to measure or the indefinition of the world as such. Without these, 
it would at best be an abstract standard against which objects’ duration is measured, 
a nothingness produced by the for-itself, a container within which objects endure. 
Instead, as the result of measuring between terrestrial and celestial bodies, time is 
immanent to bodies, and not objectively or discovered from a distance. Even if it is 
an abstraction since it is a mode of or in thought, it is an abstraction through objects 
in their duration measured against celestial motion. What is more, it is an ab-
straction of a mind that is the non-closedness of the human body. 
In this way, the debate in Descartes scholarship concerning the mind-depen-
dence or -independence of time is based on a misunderstanding of mind. Those who 
argue for its dependence claim that, “since time and duration are only modes of 
           
thought, material substance cannot, as such, have time or duration. […] Motions are 
in matter; both duration and time only help one understand motion” (Bonnen and 
Flage, 5; see also Marion, 181 – 187; Gaukroger, 368). One problem with this ar-
gument is that it ignores that rest is connected to duration, that enduring in the same 
place is a kind of motion, and so forgets that “motion presupposes duration” (Gor-
ham, 34). However the mind-dependence claim also ignores that time is the result of 
measuring those objects’ duration against celestial motion. Even if time is depen-
dent on the mind, it is not dependent as pure abstraction or ideal concept, but as the 
result of measurements of duration (see Gorham, 38n34). What allows the duration 
of terrestrial objects to be measured against celestial motion, both being of space as 
such, is the human body as a non-closed site of conjunction of indefinite aesthetic 
space. The non-closed human body, in its measuring of terrestrial objects against 
celestial, allows terrestrial objects to transcend their duration as objects so they are 
understood as having endured and as enduring, as pushing themselves through spa-
ce and time as that through which they are and endure. 
Those who argue for the mind-independence of time take this independence as 
arising from how we normally think about things: as within, not of, time. For them, 
objects have their own duration as a mode, meaning that duration in general (i.e., 
time) is a mode of objects in general (i.e., space or locus internus as such). Ken 
Levy, for example, claims that the mind-dependence argument means that time is 
either dependent on “a human construct or intuition” or results from “the imagina-
tion in the sense that an illusion or hallucination does” (Levy, 662). Even disregar-
ding the idea that time is an imaginary illusion, its dependence on intuition does not 
for him answer to Descartes’ claims in the Meditations that divine conservation of 
my being follows from the independence of the parts of time from each other (see 
Levy, 635 and 662; Descartes 1904, 48 – 49). To be clear, Levy does say that the 
Descartes of the Principles considers time mind-dependent (see Levy, 662). Ho-
wever, he still ignores that time, at least in the Principles, is a result of the mind’s 
measuring the duration of terrestrial against the motion of celestial bodies. It is not 
“the object of the ‘measure of movement’,” but its result (Levy, 663). 
What is more, to dismiss the version of the mind-dependence argument of time 
as imaginary is to ignore that we can truly imagine the indefinite as the beyond of 
our understanding, like we do with space. Time as the result of measuring terrestrial 
duration against celestial motion does not demand that time itself be an object, nor 
does the indefinition of time mean that its dependence on the mind is an illusion if 
the mind is of the non-closed human body that measures those relational differen-
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ces. Thus, time can be a non-absolute abstraction of measuring relational differen-
ces of the duration and motion of bodies, the immanent transcendence of those bo-
dies. This measurement is possible for a non-closed human body that transcends and 
discovers its own bodiliness in its mind’s discovery of itself. In other words, time 
may be dependent on mind, but it is not independent of the world’s bodies. Rather, 
it immanently transcends their duration without becoming an object against which 
to measure them. Again, time is a mode of a non-closed human body’s thought. 
The Future, or Time as Upsurge 
However, time as the result of a non-closed human body’s measuring of 
terrestrial duration against celestial motion does not address another issue concer-
ning time in Descartes: the future. Because Descartes’ space is an indefinite ple-
num, imaginary space as a container is discarded.3 Yet, if each moment of duration 
is distinct from all other moments, the possibility of imaginary time remains (see 
Gorham, 42n58). This distinction is why the received view is that, for Descartes, 
“time is ultimately composed of indivisible ‘time atoms’,” that each moment 
touches the next (Levy, 627).4 Temporal atomism means that each moment is either 
with or without duration. If without, it is difficult to understand how a series of 
durationless moments combine to form duration. If each moment itself has duration, 
either each is the mutual surface of the others’ or there is a gap between them. This 
dilemma is why there is a debate over the strength of the discontinuity between time 
atoms (see Levy, 630 – 634). 
Regardless whether the discontinuity is like that of mutual spatial surfaces or 
there is a gap between temporal atoms, their very limitation, which is necessary for 
them to combine to give duration in general (i.e., time), means that the future is a 
nothing, a container within which duration appears as successive points in a timeli-
ne. That is, if the future is considered a not-yet in relation to an indefinite linear 
                                                          
3 The Scholastic concept of imaginary space was the result of both the Aristotelian claim that God 
could not create empty space and the 1277 condemnation of this claim. In Descartes’ time, a 
common position was that space as such is distinct from the bodies that occupy it. Thus, imagina-
ry space allowed for “an empty space beyond the world…that would allow God to move the finite 
world as a whole” (Garber 1992, 127). 
4 This position is closely related to that of the mind-independence theory of time. Among the 
prominent names that hold to it are Gilson, Guerolt, and Kemp Smith. Those who reject temporal 
atomism include Beyssade and Garber (2001), though the latter claims that Descartes neither 
accepts nor rejects temporal atomism unambiguously (see Garber 2001, 194). 
           
It might still be, though, that the future is a container into which time surges. 
However, “Memory…always concerns the yet-to-come, the future” (Vallier, 123). 
A remembered experience or event has meaning “in function of an institution that 
has already occurred, and will in turn orient me to a possible future…; meaning, 
orientation, will come, advenir, come from the future, l’avenir” (Vallier, 125n3). 
The future emerges, then, as the demand of memory from out of an intertwined 
upsurge of past and present. The past as events remembered in the present has mea-
ning as past that surges, with the present that remembers and memorializes it, to-
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For him, time is an “upsurge [surgissement]” and constitutes itself (Merleau
-Ponty  1968,  184;  1964,  235).  Rather  than  being  understood  as  “a  segment  of 
time with defined contours,” the present is “a transcendent” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 
184). Thus, “The Stiftung of a point of time [point du temps] can be transmitted 
to the  others without ‘continuity’” insofar as past  and  present  intertwine like mind 
and body, self and others, human and world (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 267; 1964, 315). 
The past is part of the present as that whence it comes and the present is part of the
 past as that which recalls what has been. Each brings the other into being as what 
it is. The past is not other than the present, but is what is remembered in it, while the
present is what has endured. Thus, time is not  a  series,  but “an institution” constitu-
ting itself through the mutual intertwining of past and present, through  memory  as
what is remembered  in  the presentof thepast and the present as a consequent of what
appearance of duration, it is the other side of the limitations of all time atoms 
without being of time as the measure of terrestrial duration against celestial motion 
because even the latter would be discernible as within a time contained by the future 
as a not-yet. In this way, the future would be the pure in-itself of time nihilated by 
the for-itself’s understanding of durational things. Here, the non-closed human body 
does not seem of much help.  To take account of the future, then, a return to Mer-
leau-Ponty is necessary. 
 is remembered (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 184). Past and present, then, are to be thought
 in their conjunction, a non-distant indivisibility that joins them in separation.  In 
the  upsurge  that  is  time  constituting  itself,  there  are  immemorial  and memorial  
pasts.  The  former  is  an  “originary nonpresence” that  has  never  been  present,  
an  “original  forgetting”  that  makes  remembering, or memorial  past, possible 
(Al-Saji,  184).  It is  memorial  past’s invisible.  Through memorial  past,  “the past 
continues to  coexist  with and insinuate  itself  into the present” (Al-Saji,  188). 
Thus, memorial past and time’s institution are not Sartre’s in-itselfs nihilated by a 
present for-itself, leaving the past invisible to the present’s visible and vice-versa.  
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ward the future, thereby instituting the future in the self-constitution of time. The 
future is not the in-itself of a not-yet encompassing the for-itself of a present that 
has nihilated the in-itself of the past, but is produced through the present’s remem-
brance of the past as a past to be remembered. Each aspect of time is conjoined in 
their differences. 
If history, what seems to be memory institutionalized, is this future through 
present remembrance, then it might appear there is little room for the individual 
here. In orienting itself toward a future through the push of past and present, a spe-
cific human body “itself is an institution. Its past is not simply its own past” (Val-
lier, 123). If we appeal to the individual as a particular and specific thing, we risk 
understanding it as an atom in an objective-immanent container of space. The per-
ception of such an individual is what Merleau-Ponty calls wild perception, which is 
“of itself ignorance of itself, imperception,” merely perceiving, not perceiving 
something, a world (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 213). Wild perception is necessary, but 
only insofar as “The perceiving subject…returns from the thing itself blindly identi-
fied,” as “the untouchable of the touch, the invisible of vision, the unconscious of 
consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 201 and 255). Without this intertwining, 
“The corporeal schema would not be a schema,” nor would the schematizing body 
schematize (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 255). The body schematizes as giving meaning to 
the world as it appears, as appearing in a schema, and this meaning is the invisible 
of that world as it appears. The body that schematizes of course schematizes from 
an individual point of view or perspective, but it schematizes that perspective as 
being of a schema, as meaningful. Thus the non-closed human body is individual 
insofar as individuality is the invisible of the meaning-giving schema perceived by 
and through that body. As this invisible, its individuality is found in its “Anonymity 
and generality,” hence the possibility of subjectivity (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 201). 
The individual non-closed human body, to be individual, does not say, “I am per-
ceiving x,” but, “Perceiving x, as an x, I am, as an I.”5
This understanding helps take account of time as a mode of a non-closed hu-
man body’s thought insofar as an object endures as having endured, measured aga-
inst the motions of heavenly bodies themselves enduring as having endured. The 
duration of objects as already of an intertwined past and present pushes forth an 
                                                          
5 This approach may serve to both clarify and complicate arguments against, for instance, Locke’s 
equation of conscious memory with personal identity (see Rozemberg). 
           
aesthetic world of the present as through the past and past as remembered in the 
present. This aesthetic world is of the push, of the true imagination of the indefini-
tion of time. The future is not a container within which temporal atoms appear, but 
the continuation of the past through the present, the invisible of the past and present 
called forth through memory’s institutionalized representation of the past in the 
present. Rather than atomic, time as upsurge is a mode of thought where thought is 
understood as the transcendence of the human body whereby that body finds itself 
such that it is of the world of spatial objects coming to be through motion. Those 
objects endure as having endured, as being remembered. The future is the immanent 
transcendence of memory, the invisible of the past’s representation and the pre-
sent’s being out of the past. It endures as the name of the truly imagined indefinition 
of time as upsurge. 
The Invisible of the Divine 
If institutionalized memory is history, individual or otherwise, a final word 
about historicity in Descartes is needed. On one reading, historicity as an idea pla-
ces Descartes’ realism in “the deepest conceptual jeopardy” because it replaces “the 
supposed need for invariances and necessities” (Rockmore and Margolis, 3). In 
Merleau-Ponty, though, historicity is “the intertwining of ‘life’ and meaning” 
(Diprose, 12). How can Merleau-Ponty’s thought of historicity be conjoined with 
Descartes? A temporal body is a mode of thought and of body as the measure of the 
endurance of a terrestrial object of motion measured against celestial motion. The 
mind is the body’s invisible such that the subject as in conjunction with them can 
make these measurements. The future is the invisible of the self-constitution of time 
in past and present, the truly imagined indefinite emerging through their push as an 
aesthetic world. Celestial motion as much as terrestrial is of this time of the in-
tertwining of past and present pushing through as future. So what is Descartes’ 
historicity if we think in conjunction, and not just for humans? To address this ques-
tion, a final turn to the Principles will help. 
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Again,  the  primary  cause  of  the  motions  that  are  measured  and  measured 
against is God, “the general cause of all the motions in the world” (Descartes 1985, 
240). In creating the world, God created motion and rest, but of course God is not of 
the world, being infinite and so positively understood as having no limits, as fully 
perfect and complete. As such, Descartes’ God is the immaterial substance conjoi-
ned to the material world, or the world’s invisible. This infinite, immaterial substan-
ce does not contain the world and its motions as the nothing of an in-itself. It cannot 
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And yet, God also endures. In a letter to Arnauld, our minds “display a su-
ccessiveness” of past, present, and future in their measuring of terrestrial against 
celestial bodies, but “the duration of God [duratio Dei]” is not of succession (Des-
cartes 1991, 355; 1903, 193). Descartes seems to have hesitated on this question of 
a non-successive duration, but of import here is that God endures (see Gorham, 48). 
To be is to endure. While divine duration may not be measurable against celestial 
motions, it remains a duration, the incompossible invisible of terrestrial duration, 
immanently transcending terrestrial duration through its own. 
As creator of the truly imagined indefinition of objects pushing as aesthetic 
space, God is creator of the truly imagined indefinite time of terrestrial duration 
measured against celestial motion in an aesthetic push of presently remembered past 
oriented toward the future. God as immaterial substance discovers itself through this 
creation of matter and motion. As creator, God is of the historicity of matter, a his-
toricity itself part of the self-discovery of the immaterial substance of mind in its 
conjunction with the non-closed human body that gives meaning by schematizing 
the world as it appears. Whether God conserves this motion successively or not, the 
creation of matter and its motion is not the creation of historicity understood as the 
memorialization of the past as of the present. Succession is ‘a, then b’, not its truly 
imagined indefinition, let alone the pastness of a as remembered in b. Historicity is 
the being-historical of succession. Yet, just this is what appears in the mind’s self-
discovery through the non-closed human body’s schematizing measuring of terres-
trial against celestial motion, all conserved by God. Historicity seems to be conjoi-
ned in separation from the creation and conservation of material motion, then. It is 
that through which succession as successive appears. Insofar as God creates and 
preserves matter and its motion as matter’s invisible in a self-discovery through the 
world’s indefinition that is the infinite’s invisible, God is of the historicity that is 
succession given meaning. In this way, to be at all is to endure, in conjunction with 
the historical, and historicity is the invisible of the divine.
be  nothing  insofar  as  it  is  fully  complete.  Rather,  it  is  understood  positively  as 
transcending the indefinition of  the world through its  alterity to  that  world.  The 
world finds itself as a world of moving and non-moving motion, a non-closed and 
durational  world  through  a  divine  non-presence  that  is  indivisible  to  the  world’s 
indivisible worldliness. 
           124 
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